Locked and loaded? The EU weapons to fight Trump’s trade war.

BRUSSELS — The European Union will buy more Murican stuff after Donald Trump takes office — at least that’s one strategy for Brussels to avoid getting whacked by the United States president-elect’s threat to tariff the whole wide world into submission.
It’s true that the EU exports more to the U.S. than vice versa: Its trade surplus is on track to hit a record $230 billion this year. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s answer? Buy more U.S. liquified natural gas instead of supply from Russia. There’s no way of knowing if that will fly in a Trumpian Washington, D.C., however.
In case it doesn’t the EU is already checking to make sure its trade defense armory is locked, loaded and ready for a showdown.
“Let’s not go to that conversation without already having a retaliation option,” Ignacio García Bercero, the Commission’s U.S. point person during Trump’s first term, told POLITICO. “Because if the negotiations fail and if the United States feels that we don’t have a credible retaliation option, then we are not going to go anywhere.”
Here’s an overview of Brussels’ options, along with how we rate their caliber, trigger-happiness and expected effectiveness:
The EU struck back at Trump in 2018 — an election year — at products made in the key U.S. battleground states. Recall, for instance, how the EU found ways to increase tariffs on Harley-Davidson motorcycles, Zippo lighters, Levi jeans and bourbon. Brussels might well plan something similar to inflict similar economic pain ahead of the 2026 midterm elections.
In retaliation against Trump’s worldwide tariffs on steel and aluminum, the EU targeted Harley-Davidson motorcycles with a 56 percent import tariff. The company moved some production to Thailand, leading Republican politician Paul Ryan of Wisconsin — where Harley-Davidson is also from — to say that it was “further proof of the harm from unilateral tariffs.” Harley-Davidson later lost a case before an EU court in Luxembourg.
For what it’s worth, Harley-Davidson’s sales declined in the Europe, Middle East and Africa region to just 27,000 motorbikes from 44,000 in 2019.
García Bercero said the Commission will already “have a list prepared that would, I’m sure, have been prepared intelligently.” According to his analysis, the EU is unlikely to put up a broad tariff wall for incoming goods: “It is going to be more sophisticated [than] that.”
Pain point: Because it can hurt U.S. exports where its obvious, producers of the targeted products would be ready to lobby the Trump administration for de-escalation.
Bazooka rating: Depends on the item
The original “bazooka” — as it was called during the legislative process — the Anti-Coercion Instrument, or ACI, was intended as a deterrent. Or at least, that’s how it was always described. It’s meant to preventively counter bullying of the EU or member countries by targeting trade or investments.
In a way, the ACI is the prime example of how von der Leyen has pushed the EU into joining the worldwide weaponization of trade, albeit on the defensive side.
Having said that, the Commission could still launch the ACI against Trump’s tariffs. Especially because it doesn’t automatically put up countermeasures but first starts with “cooperative engagement” between the two parties.
Boomerang: The EU would come full circle if it taps the ACI. Because while there was speculation that it might be used against China — for instance when Beijing bullied Lithuania — Trump’s first round of tariffs in 2018 were the very reason to devise it.
Expected effectiveness: Unpredictable
More of a way to show your chagrin than an actual weapon, the EU will probably drag the U.S. to the World Trade Organization (in 2018, it did so within six days). This would not lead to any kind of solution because Washington has knocked the WTO’s main appeals court out of action. Still, because the EU is the last true believer in rules-based trade, it would at least make a point. And make Trump look uncooperative in the process that follows.
The first step of the WTO process is consulting to reach an amicable solution, followed by setting up a panel of judges. The losing party would then appeal to the incapacitated Appellate Body. And the case would gather dust.
Meh: Summing up, there’s not much value in it except for some bad publicity for Washington.
The EU could also hit the U.S. with a probe similar to the one opened against China’s unfair electric vehicles subsidies. These investigations can either target dumping — selling a product below its production cost to grab market share — or subsidies lavished on producers in the exporting country.
For instance, the EU already levies duties on U.S. biodiesel, along with some other products.
The benefit is clear: It’s a WTO-compliant weapon and the EU can argue that it is playing by the rules. But, as it’s a legal tool rather than a political one, the Commission will likely refrain from taking this path. A second reason is that these investigations take over a year to complete — hardly a quick return of fire.
Getting into the weeds here, technical barriers to trade are hidden requirements for products that effectively ban competing products from outside. It can be tricky to prove that they are intended as protectionism or as retaliation, which means they can fly under the radar for a while.
The EU already has such barriers — that is, if you ask the U.S. trade representative. For instance, in its 2024 overview of global trade barriers, Washington complained that the EU’s Deforestation Regulation was a technical barrier to trade, as are its product safety and wine-labeling rules.
Carrot instead of stick: While the EU could make things worse for U.S. exporters, reducing these technical barriers is also a huge carrot in free-trade deals. Who is to say that incoming trade czar Maroš Šefčovič or von der Leyen herself won’t seduce Trump by promising to reduce them?
Finally, the EU also has a way to break open tendering systems in other markets: It used its International Procurement Instrument against China’s restrictive medical tech market this year. While the U.S. does, for instance, have local content requirements in tenders, these are not very strictly applied and many exceptions exist.
Make a point: Still, complaining about domestic legislation would be a strong way to voice discontent for Brussels.
Camille Gijs and Doug Palmer contributed reporting. This story has been updated.